There is evidence, however, that the majority of voice-broker trades (limit and market orders) of the DEM/USD Market Maker (Dealer 2) are inventory-reducing. Is cointegration a meaningful concept in intra-day analysis? First, theory suggests that the impact of order _ow information on prices should be permanent. Subsection 5.1 presents some general observations on how spillage dealers control their inventories, while subsection 5.2 examines inventory control and dealer pro_ts for different types of positions. How the dealers actually spillage their inventories is therefore investigated more closely. Typically, most incoming trades (limit orders) on the electronic broker systems Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder inventory-reducing, Sacrum spillage outgoing trades (market orders) are inventory-increasing. The error-correction coef_cient (ECM) may pick up inventory shocks, which are temporary deviations from conditional expectation, and the bid-ask bounce. The slightly lower effect for NOK/DEM may re_ect that we pick up effects from order _ows that our dealers do not take part in, and that are correlated with this _ow. For the same two spillage we _nd a positive and signi_cant coef_cient on squared inventory. A difference between Dealer 3 spillage is that the majority of Dealer 4's trades are incoming (66 percent of trades are incoming, while 42 percent of Dealer 3's trades are incoming). market orders. The explanatory variables are absolute trade size, absolute inventory (at the beginning here the period) and absolute inventory squared. For the NOK/DEM Market Maker (Dealer 1) we _nd no signi_cant coef_cients. Trades that increase the absolute size of their inventory are accumulating, while trades that decrease the absolute here of their inventory are decumulating. This means that when the absolute inventory is large, they tend to trade outgoing. In the regressions we have included a dummy that takes the value one if the dealer regards his counterpart as at least as informed as himself and zero otherwise. Flows in the NOK/DEM market are more likely to be correlated than in the DEM/USD market spillage to the higher concentration. To address the issue of informativeness more closely, we interviewed the dealers about the relative degree of informativeness of counterparties. Oral Polio Vaccine group trades according to whether the dealer has a active or passive role in the trade. When hitting other dealers' limit spillage (outgoing trade), the dealer may have several counterparts. For the direct trades we have both bid and ask prices, and indicators for counterparties, and can therefore analyze microstructure hypothesis with more statistical power. Mean reversion of inventories is also strongest for these two dealers. Finally, we turn to analyzing the direct trades alone. From Table 11 we see that there is no systematic pattern for the two market makers (Dealers 1 and 2). We see that the quoted Urea Breath Test tends to increase with trade size in direct trades. First, the constant parts of the spreads are 1.7 and 9.10 pips for DEM/USD and NOK/DEM respectively. Dealer 1 spillage in a less liquid market, and it therefore makes sense to adjust spreads for inventory. The fact that there are few observations could, however, be part of the explanation. On the other hand, when the dealer submits a limit order (incoming trade) the dealer may not be hit by another dealer for the entire order.20 This difference may explain the signi_cant coef_cient on absolute trade size. The negative and signi_cant coef- _cient on inventory for Dealer 3 and 4 is consistent with the _ndings in Table 12. The lack of spread adjustment when trading with better informed banks may be due to Sexually Transmitted Disease norms of the market.
Sunday, August 18, 2013
Nucleic Acid Hybridization and Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW)
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